P v (Q v R) /- Q v (P v R)
(1) 1. P v (Q v R) Premise
(2) 2. P Assumption
(2) 3. P v R 2 vI
(2) 4. Q v (P v R) 3 vI
(5) 5. Q v R Assumption
(6) 6. Q Assumption
(6) 7. Q v (P v R) 6 vI
(8) 8. R Assumption
(8) 9. P v R 8 vI
(8) 10. Q v (P v R) 9 vI
(5) 11. Q v (P v R) 5,6,7,8,10 vE
(1) 12. Q v (P v R) 1,2,4,5,11 vE
It doesn't make sense to speak of THE rules of inference; there are many sets of such rules. Given that the asker wants to use vE (see his other question), it is quite clear that my proof is ideal here, as it is constructed within a system that uses that rule. Neither of the other proofs that have been offered here is constructed in an appropriate system for this particular asker.
Of course, you could design a system that treats P > P as an axiom schema, but it would be hard to ensure that it were non-redundant. The most popular axiom set is Frege's, in which P > P can easily be proved as a theorem in five lines.
Some would argue that systems that use vE are preferable to Copi's and Hurley's because (i) they contain fewer rules, and (ii) each of their rules is essential (removing it from the system renders the system incomplete). It is a virtue of the system I use that it makes it quite clear, for any given line, on what the formula on that line depends; in Copi's system, for example, such dependencies are not immediately clear.
I grant that in the case of propositional logic, the last point isn't all that important, but it makes a significant difference in predicate logic. For example, assuming we don't have recourse to quantifier-switch rules, any proof of the theoremhood of, say, (Vx)(Fx > (Ey)(Gy & Rxy)) <> (Vx)(Ey)(Fx > (Gy & Rxy)), will be decidedly unclear unless we have some way of displaying dependencies.
It's also worth pointing out that Copi's system does not permit the derivation of formulas as theorems unless we add to it some such rule as conditional proof or RAA (basically, a rule that allows us to discharge assumptions), but that just adds to the (already needlessly long) list of rules.
As a final point, if we're getting into questions of fundamentality, CP is far less controversial than material implication, which, insofar as it is used to introduce the material conditional, is CP's equivalent in such systems as Copi's. No one objects to CP, whereas plenty of people take issue with material implication. A strong case can be made for supposing it necessary for one's grasping the meaning of 'if' that one be disposed to reason in accordance with CP, but it would be absurd to regard being disposed to employ material implication as in any way necessary for such understanding. Indeed, many take the so-called paradoxes of material implication to demonstrate that 'if' and the material conditional are not even equivalent.